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ABSTRACT
Recent decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme construing the Post Conviction
Relief Act include Commonwealth v. Holmes and Commonwealth v. Abraham.
In Holmes, the Court reaffirmed the rule of deferral of ineffectiveness claims to
the post-conviction process but recognized two, limited discretionary exceptions
to the rule, one of which provides an opportunity for defendants serving short
sentences to obtain review of claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness on direct
appeal provided the defendant waives collateral review. In Abraham, the Court
held that Padilla v. Kentucky did not abrogate the traditional collateral conse-
quences rule, but instead simply identified deportation as an isolated exception
to the rule. Other decisions address the constitutionality of the requirement that
limits post-conviction relief to defendants who are in custody, whether a request
for DNA testing is timely and how a court should assess a claim of mental
retardation raised in a post-conviction proceeding.
INTRODUCTION
The Post Conviction Relief Act I ("PCRA" or "the Act") provides a procedure for
defendants to collaterally challenge their conviction or sentence. It is the sole means 2 of
obtaining collateral relief and has been broadly interpreted as creating a unified statu-
tory framework for reviewing claims that were traditionally cognizable in state habeas
corpus.3 The Act permits defendants in custody4 to seek relief when the conviction or
sentence results in one or more of the Act's enumerated errors or defects 5 and when the
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University and the author
of the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Act-Practice & Procedure (2014 ed.).
1. 42 Pa.C.S. §9541 et seq.
2. 42 Pa.C.S. §9542.
3. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §6501 et seq.
4. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(1). The Act requires a defendant to be in custody"at the time relief is granted."
5. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543 (a)(2). To avoid a bifurcated system of post-conviction review, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has not limited the PCRA to its specifically enumerated areas of review. See eg., Corn-
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claimed error has not been waived6 or previously litigated 7 on direct appeal or in a pre-
vious PCRA petition. Subject to several narrow exceptions, a petition under the Act must
be filed within one year of the date the defendant's judgment of sentence becomes fi-
nal.8 This article reports on a number of recent decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme
and Superior Court construing provisions of the Act.
INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS, POST-SENTENCE MOTIONS
AND SHORT SENTENCES
In 2002, in Commonwealth v. Grant9, the Supreme Court abandoned its long-standing
rule that claims of ineffectiveness had to be raised by new counsel at the first
opportunity, even if that first opportunity was direct appeal and the issue had not been
presented to the trial court. Under Grant, claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness are no
longer considered on direct appeal, but deferred to the post-conviction process. In
Commonwealth v. Bomar10 the Supreme Court held that Grant did not apply when de-
fendant's claims of ineffectiveness were raised by new
counsel in a post-trial motion and the trial court heard
Court recognizes testimony of trial counsel and addressed the ineffective-
two exceptions to ness claims in an opinion.In several post-Bomar cases, the Supreme Court
general rule of expressed reservations about using post-trial motions to
raise claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness and subse-deferral of ineffec- quent review of the claims on direct appeal.11 In
tiveness claims to Commonwealth v. Wright 12, the Court held that "collateral
claims should not be reviewed on post-verdict motions
the post-conviction unless the defendant waives his right to PCRA review be-
cause the PCRA does not afford the right to two collateral
process. attacks."13 The issue was addressed again in Common-
wealth v. Liston14 and in Commonwealth v. Montalvo.15 In
Liston, the Supreme Court limited Bomar to pre-Grant cases. The Court held that the
Superior Court had "overstepped its authority" when it held that whenever a PCRA
court reinstates direct appeal it must also reinstate the right to file post-sentence mo-
tions thereby allowing the defendant to raise any issue of trial counsel ineffectiveness.
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Castille rejected the use of post-trial motions to
raise ineffectiveness claims unless "accompanied by an express, knowing and voluntary
waiver of further PCRA review."16 In Montalvo,17 Chief Justice Castille in a concurring
monwealth v. Chester, 733 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1999) (applying Act to claims arising during penalty phase of a
capital case); Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999) (a claim that counsel failed to file direct ap-
peal cognizable under Act); Commonwealth v. Liebel, 825 A.2d 630 (Pa. 2003) (Act applies to claim that
counsel failed to file petition for allowance of appeal).
6. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(4), 9544(b).
7. 42 Pa.C.S. §9544(a).
8. 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(b).
9. 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002).
10. 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003).
11. Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597, 605 (Pa. 2005) (Castille, J., concurring) ("... I do not believe
that this Court is remotely obligated to permit any criminal defendant-no sentence, short sentence, long
sentence, capital sentence-to raise collateral claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, as a matter
of right upon post-trial motions.") (emphasis in original); Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1028 (Pa.
2007) (Cappy, C.J., concurring) ("My fear is that continued employment of the'Bomar' exception will even-
tually swallow the rule we announced in Grant governing the presentation of ineffectiveness claims.").
12. 961 A.2d 119 (Pa. 2008)
13. 961 A.2d at 148 n.22.Two of the four participating justices in Wright joined Justice Eakin in footnote
22.
14. 977 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2009).
15. 986 A.2d 84 (Pa. 2009).
16. 977 A.2d at 1096 (Castille, C.J., concurring). Two of the five member Court in Liston joined the Chief
Justice's concurring opinion.
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opinion, directed lower courts not to review ineffectiveness claims raised in post-trial
motions unless the defendant waives his right to post-conviction review.1 8 In
Commonwealth v. Barnett,19 the Superior Court held that fully developed ineffectiveness
claims would not be reviewed on direct appeal absent an express, knowing and volun-
tary waiver of PCRA review.
In Commonwealth v. Baker,20 the Superior Court reviewed a purported waiver of PCRA
review that preceded the trial court's consideration of defendant's claim of trial counsel
ineffectiveness raised by new counsel in a post-sentence motion. Because the court con-
cluded that the waiver was not valid21 , it declined to review the defendant's claim of trial
counsel ineffectiveness on direct appeal. Noting that the question of what constitutes a
valid waiver under Barnett was a matter of first impression, the court held that a valid
waiver of PCRA rights requires defendant's participation in an on-the-record colloquy,
which includes but is not limited to an explanation of (1) the eligibility of PCRA relief;
(2) the right to be represented by counsel in a first PCRA petition; (3) the types of issues
that can be raised pursuant to the PCRA that are now being given up; and (4) that the
PCRA is the sole means of obtaining nearly all types of collateral review. The Court
stated that the trial court must also ensure the defendant has "made the decision to
waive his PCRA rights after consulting with counsel (if any) and in consideration of his
rights, as they have been explained in the colloquy."
22
In Commonwealth v. Holmes23, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court returned to the issue
of whether claims of ineffectiveness can be reviewed on post-sentence motions and di-
rect appeal under Bomar and Grant if the defendant waives review as of right under the
PCRA. 2 4 Although the Court in Holmes reaffirmed Grant and limited Bomar to its pre-
Grant facts, Chief Justice Castille writing for the Court, recognized two limited discre-
tionary exceptions to Grant's general rule of deferral of ineffectiveness claims to the
post-conviction process. First, the Court held that a trial court has discretion to decide
discrete claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness raised on a post-sentence motion where
17. The Court agreed in Montalvo to hear claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness on direct appeal
because the record pertaining to the claims had been developed in the trial court prior to the Grant
decision.
18. 986 A.2d at 111 (Castille, C.J., concurring) ("As I made clear in my recent concurrence in [Liston]-
and in this regard I spoke for majority of the Liston Court-going forward, the lower courts should not
indulge hybrid review by invoking Bomar.").
19. 25 A.3d 371 (Pa. Super 2011) (en banc).
20. 72 A. 3d 652 (Pa. Super 2013).
21. The court found the waiver invalid because the defendant was left with the impression that he
would be waiving only the specific ineffectiveness claims presented on direct appeal and not the entire
post-conviction process.
22. Instead of remanding for a new waiver colloquy, the court dismissed the ineffectiveness claims
without prejudice to being raised in a timely PCRA petition.
23. 79 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2013). Following his conviction, Holmes filed a counseled PCRA petition seeking
reinstatement of his right to direct appeal due to trial counsel's failure to file a requested direct appeal.
Holmes subsequently amended the petition raising multiple substantive claims of ineffectiveness of trial
counsel. The trial court reinstated Holmes's direct appeal nunc pro tunc without addressing the ineffec-
tiveness claims. In the Superior Court, Holmes raised only claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. The
Superior Court following its decision in Commonwealth v. Liston, 941 A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc),
remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to permit Holmes to file his ineffectiveness claims
by post-sentence motions nunc pro tunc. Following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's disapproval of the
Superior Court's holding in Liston (997 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2009), the Court granted allocatur in Holmes to
decide whether Holmes's ineffectiveness claims were reviewable on direct appeal under Bomar, should
instead be deferred to collateral review, or should be reviewable on direct appeal only if accompanied
by a waiver of Holmes's right to file a PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 996 A.2d 479 (Pa. 2010).
24. Holmes also contains an extended discussion of Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012) and its
impact on review of ineffectiveness claims in Pennsylvania post-Grant. In Martinez, the United States
Supreme Court announced a "narrow exception" to the rule that a claim of ineffectiveness of trial coun-
sel is defaulted for purposes of federal habeas corpus review if not first presented to the state court.
Under Martinez, a defendant may establish cause for a default of an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim when such claims are required, as in Pennsylvania, to be presented in an initial review post-con-
viction proceeding, where the state court did not appoint counsel in the post-conviction proceeding or
where appointed counsel in the initial-review proceeding was ineffective. In addition, the defendant
must demonstrate that the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a "substantial"
claim, namely a"claim that has some merit."
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the claims are both meritorious and apparent from the record "so that immediate con-
sideration and relief is warranted."25 The Court described this exception as "an extraor-
dinary case" and noted that by recognizing the exception, it was not authorizing the trial
court to appoint new counsel to search for ineffectiveness claims.
The second exception to Grant provides the trial court with discretion to consider mul-
tiple claims of ineffectiveness in a post-sentence motion, including non-record based
claims and other post-conviction claims where (1) good cause is shown, and (2) the de-
fendant waives PCRA review of his conviction and sentence. The Court noted that broad
and unitary review where the defendant waives PCRA rights permits more timely re-
view of collateral review claims without the defendant having to forego claims normally
presented on direct appeal. In addition, such review will occur when events are fresher
in the memories of witnesses and counsel should have a better recollection"of the rea-
sons for the actions that form the basis for ineffectiveness claims."
26
This exception to the general rule of deferral explicitly addresses the effect of Grant on
defendants who receive short prison or probationary sentences. As the Court acknowl-
edged in its O'Berg27 decision rejecting an exception to Grant in such cases, the "net ef-
fect"of the Grant rule and the statutory requirement that a defendant must be"currently
serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole" at the time collateral relief is
granted was to leave defendants with short sentences without either direct appeal or
collateral review to challenge trial counsel's ineffectiveness. The Court specifically noted
that in short sentence cases, the trial court's determination of good cause should include
the length of the sentence imposed and whether, in light of the sentence, the defendant
will be eligible for relief under the PCRA.28 As it had noted in O'Berg, the Court in
Holmes acknowledged the difficulty of determining whether the length of the sentence
imposed would preclude PCRA review but urged trial courts to err on the side of per-
mitting the defendant's to challenge the effectiveness of trial counsel where the right
would be "otherwise susceptible to forfeiture."
29
While the Court describes waiver of PCRA rights as the sine qua non of unitary review
and requires a"full PCRA waiver colloquy", the decision does not address the elements
of a valid waiver other than requiring the trial court to explain to the defendant that the
defendant is waiving his right to file a first PCRA petition and that any subsequent
PCRA review is limited to the three narrow exceptions to the one-year filing period.
30
Notwithstanding the waiver, to prevent a defendant from seeking PCRA review where
relief is denied on direct appeal, Holmes holds that the time spent litigating collateral
claims by post-sentence motion and direct appeal counts toward the one-year period
3
'
in which a PCRA petition must be filed. Like the PCRA which provides indigent defen-
dants a rule-based right to counsel only after the defendant has filed a petition3 2 , Holmes
does not authorize the trial court "to appoint new counsel to facilitate requests for uni-
tary review or to indulge a defendant's complaints about trial counsel."33 Presumably,
25. Id. at 577.
26. Holmes, 79 A.3d at 579.
27. In Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005), the Supreme Court rejected a"short sentence"
exception to Grant.The Court noted that the harm to defendants with short sentences caused by the Grant
rule"cannot be used to defeat" the reasons underlying deferral of ineffectiveness claims to the post-con-
viction process.The court also noted that the proposed exception was"too ambiguous"to give trial courts
sufficient guidance as to when a sentence fell within the exception. For a discussion of Grant and short-
term sentences, see Thomas M. Place, Ineffectiveness of Counsel and Short Term Sentences in Pennsylvania: A
Claim in Search of a Remedy, 16 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. (Fall 2007).
28. The court noted that few post-conviction petitions are finally resolved within a year of the sentence
being imposed.
29. Holmes, 79 A.3d at 578.
30. The exceptions in 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(b) to the one-year filing period are governmental interference,
the discovery of new facts, and a new constitutional right given retroactive effect. A petition invoking one
or more the exceptions must be filed within sixty days of the date the claim could have been presented.
31. 42 Pa.C.S.§9545(b)(1).
32. Pa.R.C.P. 904(B).
33. Id. at 580.The Court noted that under Pa.R.Crim.P. 122 (B)(2) appointment of counsel is effective un-
til final judgment, including direct appeal.
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new counsel 34 would be appointed for indigent defendants in the event the defendant is
successful in filing a timely pro se post-sentence motion challenging the ineffectiveness
of trial counsel 35.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Saylor stated that where it is clear that where the
length of defendant's sentence would preclude PCRA review, the "only rational choice"
for the court is to consider the defendant's constitutional claims on direct review or by
means of some other guaranteed review process. In this regard, he noted that it was
"problematic"to require a waiver as a"prerequisite"to a defendant gaining access to his
constitutionally guaranteed right to direct appeal. 36 Finally, Justice Saylor noted that if
the trial court incorrectly concludes that PCRA review will be available, the deferred
claims should not"evaporate" if the court has guessed wrongly. In such a case, the de-
ferred claims should be resolved either under the PCRA despite the Act's one-year fil-
ing period, or pursuant to a"common-law review procedure."Justice Eakin's concurring
opinion noted his disagreement that the required waiver under the "good cause" ex-
ception include all future collateral review. In his view, the waiver should be "issue-
specific", namely, issues considered on direct review could not later be the subject of a
PCRA petition. In his concurring opinion, Justice Baer cautioned defendants to use the
"good cause" waiver exception in only short sentence cases and not in cases where the
defendant's sentence permits the investigation and presentation of non-record based in-
effectiveness claims under the PCRA. Justice Todd's concurring opinion also took issue
with the scope of the waiver under the"good cause" exception. In her view, in cases other
than those involving short sentences, the comprehensive waiver required by the major-
ity renders the exception "illusory" because she believes that competent counsel would
not advocate use of the exception"upon pain of waiver of yet unknown ineffectiveness
claims." 37 Instead, Justice Todd proposed a limited waiver in which the defendant would
waive the right under the PCRA to "raise any layered ineffectiveness claim for which
trial counsel's failure to object is part of the arguable merits assessment" under Pennsyl-
vania's three-part ineffectiveness test.
38
In Commonwealth v. Turner,39 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed an order of a
PCRA court finding Section 9543(a)(1)(i) of the PCRA unconstitutional. This section limits
post-conviction relief to defendants currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, pro-
bation or parole. Turner had received a sentence of two years of probation. Although
Turner filed her initial petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel within the
Act's one-year filing period, the petition was pending when she completed her sentence
of probation. The PCRA court denied the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss Turner's
petition holding that Section 9543(a)(1)(i), as applied, denied Turner a remedy to vindi-
cate her right to effective assistance of counsel.
34. By waiving the right to file an initial PCRA the defendant is without a remedy to challenge the
effectiveness of post-sentence motion and direct appeal counsel.
35. It is unlikely that Holmes will provide many indigent defendants with short sentences a remedy to
vindicate their right to effective trial counsel. The decision does not require trial courts imposing short
sentences or trial counsel in such cases to specifically inform defendants of the opportunity Holmes pro-
vides to advance PCRA review by asserting ineffectiveness and other cognizable collateral claims in a
post-sentence motion. Trial counsel is not obliged to raise his own ineffectiveness and is frequently not
aware of acts or omissions that may constitute ineffectiveness of counsel. Even if the defendant is aware
of the Holmes exception, it is unlikely that a defendant, while still represented by trial counsel, will iden-
tify a claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness or other post-conviction claim and prepare and file a pro se
post-sentence motion within 10-days of sentencing. The Holmes procedure is equally challenging for
defendants who can afford counsel. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 771 (Pa. 2013) (Todd, J.
dissenting).
36. Pa. Const. art.V, §9.
37. Although not noted by Justice Todd, in the context of guilty pleas, a number of bar ethics commit-
tees have ruled that defense counsel may not ethically advise clients to sign a plea agreement containing
an express waiver of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Michael Cassidy, Some Reflections on
Ethics and Plea Bargaining: An Essay in Honor of Fred Zacharias, 48 San Diego L. Rev. 93, 106 (2011)
38. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987).
39. 80 A.3d 754 (Pa. 2013).
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The Supreme Court reversed the PCRA court's finding that the custody requirement
of the Act was unconstitutional. The Court initially noted that Turner had not claimed
that deferring claims of ineffectiveness to collateral review pursuant to Commonwealth v.
Grant4° had denied her appellate review in violation of Article V, section 9 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Instead, Turner argued that she was deprived of her liberty
because (1) Grant prevented her from obtaining judicial review of her ineffectiveness on
direct appeal and (2) the PCRA precluded review because she completed her sentence
before PCRA relief was granted. The Court rejected Turner's argument holding that she
did not have a protected liberty interest in collateral review because she was no longer
subject to a state sentence.The Court noted that by limiting collateral relief to those serv-
ing sentences of confinement, the legislature simply chose not to provide a collateral re-
view process for defendants who have completed such sentences. Due process, the
Court said, does not require a state to provide unlimited opportunities for collateral re-
view of constitutional claims. Instead, a state is free to impose"rational limits in support
of finality of judgments."The Court also held that to the extent due process guaranteed
Turner a right to review of her ineffectiveness claim, Turner failed to raise her claim in a
post-sentence motion and, thereafter, on direct appeal pursuant to Commonwealth v.
Bomar.41 In addition, the Court found that Turner did not promptly seek PCRA relief dur-
ing her two-year sentence or request expedited consideration of her claim. As a result,
Turner failed to give the PCRA court a "fair opportunity to resolve her claim" while still
serving her sentence.
42
Justices Saylor and Todd dissented. Justice Saylor stated that Turner should not be pe-
nalized for adhering to the "strong preference" expressed in Grant for deferral of inef-
fectiveness claims to the post-conviction process. He also noted that although Turner
had not claimed a violation of her right to appeal under the Pennsylvania Constitution,
the claims she asserted overlapped with the issue of Turner having "at least one oppor-
tunity" to present a constitutional challenge to a her conviction. Justice Todd, noting the
multiple difficulties of a defendant timely asserting an ineffectiveness claim under the
Bomar exception to Grant, stated that the Bomar procedure was"insufficient to satisfy"the
due process claim presented by Turner.
GUILTY PLEAS AND COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
In Commonwealth v. Abraham43, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the issue
of whether the distinction in Pennsylvania between direct and collateral consequences
of a conviction for purposes of defining effective assistance of counsel remains viable in
light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky.44 Abraham, a
40. 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002)
41. 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003).
42. The Court also held that Turner was not eligible for either habeas corpus or coram nobis relief.
43. 62 A.3d 343 (Pa. 2012).
44. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). Padilla, a non-citizen, pled guilty to transporting drugs not knowing it was a de-
portable offense. He later claimed his lawyer not only failed to advise him that his plea would subject
him to deportation but in fact assured him that he"did not have to worry about immigration status since
he had been in the country so long." He alleged that he would have gone to trial but for the incorrect ad-
vice from his lawyer. Although Kentucky had denied Padilla relief on the basis that risk of deportation
concerned a collateral matter not within the sentencing authority of the trial court, the Supreme Court
noted that it had never applied the distinction between direct and collateral consequences to determine
whether counsel provided "reasonable professional assistance" and was not required in this case to con-
sider whether the distinction was appropriate because of the "unique nature of deportation."The Court
noted that it had long-recognized that deportation was a particularly severe "penalty". The Court held
that the "weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise a nonciti-
zen concerning the risk of deportation." Where deportation consequences of a plea are "truly clear,"
namely, the immigration statute is "succinct and straightforward", counsel must inform the noncitizen
client that a guilty plea will make him eligible for deportation. Where the deportation consequences of a
plea are "unclear or uncertain", the Court held that the duty of counsel is more limited. When the law is
not"succinct and straightforward", counsel fulfills his obligation to his noncitizen client by advising him
that"pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences." Here, the Court
found that the deportation consequences were "truly clear" and, therefore, counsel had an obligation to
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high school teacher, entered a negotiated guilty plea to certain sexual offenses commit-
ted in the course of his employment. After learning that his plea would result in the for-
feiture of his state pension under the Public Employees Pension Forfeiture Act 45
(PEPFA), he sought to withdraw his plea. Following the trial court's denial of the motion,
Abraham filed a PCRA petition alleging plea counsel was ineffective in failing to advise
him that his guilty plea would result in the forfeiture of his pension. The PCRA court de-
nied relief holding that the loss of pension rights was collateral to the plea and that
counsel's failure to inform Abraham of this fact was not relevant to whether his plea was
knowing and voluntary under Commonwealth v. Frometa.46 The Superior Court reversed
but did not apply the direct versus collateral consequences analysis of Frometa.47
Holding that Frometa had been abrogated by Padilla and noting that it was unclear
whether direct/collateral analysis was still viable post-Padilla, the court analyzed the
pension forfeiture using a civil/penal analysis.48 Concluding that loss of pension was
"punitive in nature", the court held counsel was obligated to warn Abraham of the loss
of the pension as a consequence of pleading guilty.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Superior Court. The Court held that
Padilla did not abrogate the use of direct/collateral analysis in cases not involving de-
portation. The Court also held that the general holding of Frometa remained unchanged,
namely, counsel is not ineffective for failing to advise a defendant of the collateral con-
sequences of a guilty plea because a defendant's lack of knowledge of such conse-
quences does not undermine the validity of the guilty plea. The Court used the analysis
set out by the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe49 and Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez5 ° to determine whether forfeiture of a state pension is a criminal penalty,
namely a direct consequence of pleading guilty, or a civil penalty which the sentencing
judge has no control over. Under the first prong of Smith, the Court found that the leg-
islature did not intend the PEPFA to be punitive in nature.The Court also concluded that
under the second prong of Smith, using the Mendoza-Martinez factors51, the pension for-
feiture provisions of the PEPFA were not "so punitive in force or effect as to negate the
legislative intent" that the forfeiture provisions operate as a civil remedy. Having deter-
mined that the PEPFA is not punitive and thus a collateral consequence of Abraham's
guilty plea, the Court concluded that counsel could not be deemed ineffective for failing
to advise Abraham that he would lose his pension benefit upon entry of his guilty plea.52
advise Padilla that the offense to which he was pleading guilty would subject him to automatic deporta-
tion. The case was remanded to determine whether Padilla had been prejudiced by counsel's deficient
performance.
45. 43 P.S. §§1311-1315.
46. 555 A.2d 92 (Pa. 1989). In Frometa, the Court held that deportation was a collateral consequence of
a guilty plea and, as a result, did not need to be explained to the defendant.
47. The court held that Padilla abrogated Frometa.
48. The court analyzed the pension forfeiture under the test applied in Lehman v. Pennsylvania State
Police, 839 A.2d 265 (Pa. 2003). Alternatively, the court concluded it would reach the same result under
direct/collateral consequences analysis.
49. 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
50. 372 U.S. 144 (1963)
51. The Mendoza-Martinez factors are "whether the sanction involves an affirmative sanction or dis-
ability, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a
finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose
to which it may rationally be connected is assignable to it, and whether it appears excessive in relation
to alternative purpose assigned."
52. Justice Todd dissented disagreeing with the majority's reliance on Frometa. She interpreted Padilla
as requiring counsel to advise a defendant of a consequence of a guilty plea where, as here, the specific
consequence is a particularly severe penalty and is intimately related to the underlying criminal offense.
Because Justice Todd viewed direct/collateral analysis unsuitable post-Padilla, she concluded Abraham's
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be resolved applying the Strickland v. Washington analy-
sis used by the Court in Padilla. Citing the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty: Defense
Function, Justice Todd was in agreement with the Superior Court that Abraham's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel had arguable merit and that counsel's performance fell below the standard of "rea-
sonable professional assistance" required by the Sixth Amendment.
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In several recent cases in which defendants entered guilty pleas and, as a result, faced
deportation, the Superior Court considered whether the defendants were entitled to
PCRA relief under Padilla. In Commonwealth v. Wah 53, a non-resident alien entered ne-
gotiated pleas to Medicaid fraud and forgery involving an amount in excess of $10,000.
Under federal law, an alien will be deported if convicted of an "aggravated felony"which
includes fraud or deceit where the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000. Several months
after the plea, Wah sought post-conviction relief on grounds that plea counsel was inef-
fective in failing to advise him of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty to
fraud in excess of $10, 000. In contrast to Padilla where counsel told his client "not to
worry" about his immigration status, counsel here advised Wah that there could be de-
portation consequences as a result of his plea. In addition, counsel recommended that
Wah consult with an immigration attorney to"learn the specific consequences" of plead-
ing guilty to the charges in question. On appeal, Wah claimed counsel's responsibility to
advise him of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty was "nondelegable" be-
cause review of the relevant immigration statutes would have revealed that pleading
guilty to Medicaid fraud in an amount greater than $10,000 would subject him to auto-
matic deportation. Wah argued that referral to an immigration specialist satisfies Padilla
only in cases where the immigration consequences of a plea are not readily discernable.
In rejecting Wah's ineffectiveness claim, the court noted that Padilla recognized that
"where deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain, counsel's
duty is "more limited" and counsel need only advise a "noncitizen client that criminal
charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences." In contrast to Padilla,
where the immigration consequences of the plea were "truly clear", the Superior Court
found that the statute governing Wah's deportation was "more complex". As a result, the
court found counsel acted within the range of professionally competent assistance when
he advised Wah to consult with an immigration attorney54 if he wanted to ascertain the
specific immigration consequences of his guilty plea.
55
In Commonwealth v. McDennitt,56 the court considered whether counsel provided his
noncitizen client the necessary advice required by Padilla where the client entered a
negotiated plea of no contest to a charge of possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver.5 7 During the plea, counsel told his client that his conviction rendered
him "deportable." In his PCRA, McDermitt argued that his plea was involuntary because
counsel was required by Padilla to advise him more specifically about the immigration
consequences of his plea. McDermiit claimed counsel was obligated to inform him "not
just that his conviction carried a risk of deportation but that he actually would be de-
ported."The court affirmed denial of relief holding that Padilla merely requires counsel
to inform a noncitizen "as to a risk of deportation, not as to its certainty."
58
The Superior court returned to the issue of whether counsel's advice to his non-
citizen client was "sufficiently definite" to satisfy Padilla in Commonwealth v. Escobar.59 Prior
to Escobar's plea to possession with intent to deliver cocaine, counsel informed Escobar
that it was "likely and possible" that as the result of his plea he would be subject to de-
53. 42 A.3d 335 (Pa. Super. 2012).
54. See also Commonwealth v. Ghisoiu, 63 A.3d 1272 (Pa. Super. 2013).
55. The court also found that Wah was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to seek a continuance so that
he could make additional payments to bring the amount outstanding below $10,000 at the time his plea
was entered. Wah failed to establish that such a continuance would have been granted. Moreover, even
if Wah had made additional payments prior to the entry of his plea, the court found that it was unlikely
that he would have avoided deportation as immigration officials are not bound by the amount of resti-
tution made at the time the plea is entered.
56. 66 A.3d 810 (Pa. Super. 2013).
57. Like Padilla, McDermitt's offense rendered him deportable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(B) (i).
The Supreme Court noted in Padilla "that virtually every drug offense except for only the most insignif-
icant marijuana offenses, is a deportable offense under 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(B)(i)."
58. The court noted that even if Padilla required counsel to advise his client as to the certainty of
deportation, it was not necessary here because defendant was already voluntarily in the process of being
deported.
59. 70 A.3d 838 (Pa. Super. 2013).
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portation proceedings. Escobar also signed a plea colloquy containing two provisions in-
dicating that he understood that deportation was possible. 60 In his PCRA, Escobar
claimed counsel was ineffective in failing to properly advise him of the deportation con-
sequences arising from his conviction. Noting that deportation proceedings had begun
against Escobar on the basis of the same immigration statute at issue in Padilla,61 the
PCRA court granted Escobar relief on the basis that counsel's advice was inadequate be-
cause it did not state with certainty that he would be deported on the basis of his guilty
plea. The Superior Court reversed stating that it disagreed with the PCRA court's inter-
pretation of the language in Padilla that when deportation is a "truly clear" consequence,
counsel must inform his client that"he definitely would be deported." While the court
acknowledged that Escobar's offense made him deportable, the court noted that
whether immigration officials would in fact take the steps to deport Escobar"was not an
absolute certainty when he pled."The court concluded that counsel's advice to Escobar
was, in fact,"correct", consistent with Padilla, and therefore within the "range of compe-
tence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." In support of its holding, the court
stated that it did not read the immigration statute or the Supreme Court's language in
Padilla as "announcing a guarantee that actual deportation proceedings are a certainty
such that counsel must advise a defendant to that effect."62
In Commonwealth v. Rachak,63 the Superior Court considered whether a noncitizen
who waives counsel and enters a guilty plea is entitled to PCRA relief on the basis that
he had no knowledge that his plea would subject him to deportation proceedings.
Rachak waived counsel and, after a full colloquy pursuant to Pa.R.Crim. 590, entered a
guilty plea to possession of cocaine. Rachak did not challenge the voluntariness of his
plea on direct appeal64 but instead sought PCRA relief on the grounds that his plea was
not knowing and voluntary because he did not understand the immigration conse-
quences of his plea. The PCRA court's denial of relief was affirmed by the Superior
Court. The court found that Rachak was properly advised of his right to counsel and
knowingly and voluntarily waived the right after a full colloquy. The court agreed with
the PCRA court that Padilla did not require trial courts to determine if a defendant en-
tering a plea is a citizen of the United States nor did the Supreme Court place the re-
sponsibility on courts 65 to inform defendants of the immigration consequences of en-
tering a guilty plea. Because there was no indication that Rachak was induced to plead
guilty despite being innocent, 66 the court concluded that Rachak was not entitled to
PCRA relief.
In Commonwealth v. Barndt,67 the Superior Court considered whether counsel was in-
effective when he gave Barndt incorrect information about the amount of street time he
would lose as the result of a guilty plea to a drug charge. Brandt was concerned that he
would lose the approximately thirty months of parole he had served as part of a prior
sentence on a separate drug conviction. During plea discussions of a negotiated sen-
tence in lieu of a mandatory minimum sentence, the prosecutor wrote to defense coun-
sel indicting that the parole board had estimated that Brandt would lose eleven months
60. At the PCRA hearing, counsel testified that he advised Escobar before the plea that he faced a sub-
stantial deportation risk.
61. See footnote 56 supra.
62. The court acknowledged that portions of Padilla arguably support the view that in some cases
counsel "may have a duty to provide" clear advice about the certainty of deportation. Nonetheless, the
court concluded that the Supreme Court's"overall emphasis" in Padilla was that the immigration statute
in question makes most defendants pleading to drug offenses "subject to deportation in the sense they
certainly become deportable, not in the sense that plea counsel should know and state with certainty"
that immigration officials will, in fact initiate deportation proceedings.
63. 62 A.3d 389 (Pa. Super. 2012)
64. The court held that the issue of the voluntariness of Rachak's guilty plea should have been raised
on direct appeal. Because it was not, the court concluded that the issue was waived.
65. In Padilla, the Court noted that many states"require trial courts to advise defendants of possible
immigration consequences." 599 U.S. 356, 374 fn.15 (2010).
66. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543(a)(2)(iii).
67. 74 A.3d 185 (Pa. Super. 2013).
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of street time but could not give her"a guarantee on the exact amount of street time"he
would lose. The prosecutor indicated that she would agree to a modification of sentence
if Barndt, in fact, lost thirty months of street time as the result of his new conviction.
Brandt did not see the letter from the prosecutor until after the entry of his guilty plea.
Subsequently, the Parole Board rescinded the entire amount of street time Barndt had
served on the prior conviction. Thereafter, Brandt filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea arguing that he entered the plea with the understanding from counsel that he
would lose no more than eleven months of street time. The trial court treated the motion
as a PCRA petition challenging the effectiveness of plea counsel and, after a hearing, dis-
missed the petition. The court found counsel was not ineffective because Brandt under-
stood at the time of his guilty plea that the amount of street time he would lose was un-
certain in light of the discretion of the Parole Board.
The Superior Court reversed finding plea counsel ineffective in erroneously advising
Brandt of the parole consequences of his guilty plea. The court noted initially that in
Abraham, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had held the framework of Commonwealth v.
Frometa68 in which counsel has an obligation to advise his client of direct, but not collat-
eral consequences of entering a guilty plea, continued to govern claims of ineffective-
ness in cases other than deportation. Next, the court noted that it had been long estab-
lished in Pennsylvania 69 that the possibility of probation/parole revocation is a collateral
consequence of a guilty plea and the fact that a defendant is not informed of such a pos-
sibility does not undermine the validity of his plea. The court held it was "equally clear"
that where plea counsel provides erroneous advise and, as a result, misleads his client
about a collateral consequence of a plea, plea counsel is ineffective. 70 Here, the court
found that plea counsel misrepresented the content of the prosecutor's letter and as a
result, misled Brandt to believe he would lose no more than eleven months of street time
as the result of pleading guilty. Because Brandt did not see the letter until after he en-
tered his plea, the court found that Brandt had"little choice"but to rely upon counsel's
representations. In addition, the court relied upon plea counsel's own admission to
Brandt that he had misled him regarding the parole consequences of his plea. Finding
that Brandt had been prejudiced by counsel's erroneous advice, the court found plea
counsel provided ineffective assistance in advising Brandt regarding the parole conse-
quences of his guilty plea.
71
DNA TESTING
In two recent cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed issues of first im-
pression under the 2002 amendments to the PCRA which established a procedure by
which a defendant in custody may seek DNA testing by filing a motion with the sen-
tencing court.72 The motion must specify the evidence to be tested and acknowledge that
if the motion is granted, any data obtained from samples or test results may be entered
in law enforcement databases. 73 In addition, the motion must assert the defendant's in-
nocence of the crime for which he or she was convicted.74 The defendant must present a
primafacie case demonstrating that the identity or participation of the perpetrator in the
crime was at issue at trial and that exculpatory DNA testing would establish the defen-
68. 555A.2d 92 (Pa. 1999) abrogated in part.
69. Commonwealth v. Brown, 680 A.2d 884,887 (Pa. Super. 1996). See also Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board
of Probation & Parole, 501 A.2d 1110, 1112 (Pa. 1985).
70. Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 139 (Pa. Super. 2002); Commonwealth v. Kersteter, 877 A.2d 466
(Pa. Super. 2005); Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899 A.2d 365 (Pa. Super. 2006); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 506
A.2d 420 (Pa. Super. 1986)
71. In the dissent's view, Brandt failed to establish plea counsel was ineffective because he acknowl-
edged during the guilty plea colloquy that he understood his guilty plea would result in a violation of
parole and failed to call plea counsel as a witness at the PCRA hearing.
72. 42 Pa.C.S.§9543.1.
73. 42 Pa..C.S. §9543.1(c)(1)(iii).
74. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543.1(c)(2)(i).
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dant's actual innocence of the offense 75 .The defendant is not required to show that DNA
testing would be favorable 76. However, the court must review the motion and trial record
and make a determination as to whether "there is a reasonable probability that DNA
testing would produce exculpatory evidence" 77 that would establish the defendants ac-
tual innocence. 78 After testing, the defendant may petition for post-conviction relief dur-
ing the 60-day period following notification of the test results. Requests for DNA tests
are"separate and distinct from claims" arising under the PCRA.79 While the PCRA's one-
year time bar8° does not apply to a motion for DNA testing and no time limits are placed
on such motions, the Act requires the court to determine if the motion is made in a
"timely manner" to demonstrate "actual innocence" and "not to delay the execution of
sentence or administration of justice."81
In Commonwealth v. Edmiston82, a capital case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court con-
sidered whether defendant's motion for DNA testing of blood samples and swabs taken
from the victim was timely under the Act. The Court affirmed the denial of Edmiston's
motion. 83 The Court initially noted that at the time of his trial in 1989, Edmiston indi-
cated that he was satisfied with the DNA testing that had been conducted and did not
request further testing then nor during his first PCRA which concluded in 2004 after the
enactment of the DNA Testing Act. Edmiston did not seek testing as part of his second
PCRA petition or as part of the amendment to that petition. Rather, it was not until after
his second petition was near completion that Edmiston finally sought testing of evidence
that he had known of since his trial twenty years earlier. The Court noted that during this
period Edmiston had been represented by numerous lawyers who were aware of both
the technology and evidence in question. The Court held that the statute does not make
advances in technology an "excuse" for failing to timely request testing and neither the
nature of the issues raised in the Edmiston's PCRA petition or the capital nature of the
petition were relevant to the issue of timeliness. In light of the strength of the prosecu-
tion's case at trial, Edmiston's decision at trial not to seek further testing and his deci-
sion not to pursue testing during lengthy post-conviction proceedings, the Court con-
cluded that Edmiston's DNA testing motion was not made in a "timely manner" for the
purpose of demonstrating his innocence and not to delay the "execution of sentence or
administration of justice."
In Commonwealth v. Scarborough84, the Court considered whether an order granting a
motion for post-conviction DNA testing is a final order from which an immediate appeal
to the Superior Court may be taken. In the trial court, Scarborough sought PCRA relief
on the basis of"after discovered evidence" and an alleged Brady violation. At the same
time, he filed a separate motion for DNA testing. The trial court held that the PCRA pe-
tition was untimely but granted the motion for DNA testing. The Commonwealth filed a
notice appeal and, in response, Scarborough filed an application in the Superior Court
to have the appeal quashed on grounds that the appeal was taken from an interlocutory
order. The Superior Court agreed and subsequently quashed the appeal. 85 In reversir.g
75. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543.1(c)(3).
76. Commonwealth v. Smith, 889 A.2d 852,854 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 905 A.2d 500 (Pa. 2006)
77. Id.
78. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543.1(d)(2).
79. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543.1(f)(1).
80. Commonwealth v. Conway, 14 A.3d, 101, 108 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 29 A.3d 795 (Pa. 2011).
81. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543.1(d)(1)(iii).
82. 65 A.3d 339 (Pa. 2013).
83. Although the PCRA court concluded that the motion was timely, it denied relief on the basis that
case law at time precluded DNA testing where the defendant had confessed to the crime.The Court sub-
sequently held in Commonwealth v. Wright, 14 A.3d 789 (Pa. 2011) that there is no prohibition in the Act
that precludes a convicted individual who has confessed to the crime and who otherwise meets the
requirements from obtaining DNA testing.
84. 64 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2013).
85. The Superior Court concluded that the DNA testing order was not a final order because it did not
dispose of all the claims because it was merely a"precursor"to defendants's PCRA petition and because
it did not"put anyone out of court" nor resolve the entire case. The court also concluded that the testing
order was not a collateral order which was immediately appealable.
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and remanding the case, the Supreme Court initially noted that its discussion of
whether the order was final would focus on Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) which defines a final or-
der as one that"disposes of all claims and of all parties... ."86 The Court also noted that
case law defined a final order as "one that ends the litigation or disposes of the entire
case.' 87 A motion for DNA testing, the Court stated, is wholly separate from a challenge
to a defendant's conviction or sentence under the PCRA. The only claim at issue in such
a motion is whether the convicted individual is eligible for such testing under the
statute. Therefore, when the trial court enters an order granting or denying the re-
quested testing, the "sole claim between the parties ... has been addressed by the trial
court and finally disposed of."Because an order granting or denying testing"disposes of
all the issues" before the court, the court concluded that the order is final and immedi-
ately appealable.
PCRA COUNSEL INEFFECTIVENESS AND RESPONSE TO
NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS
If the PCRA court concludes that the defendant is not entitled relief and no purpose
would be served by further proceedings, Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 requires the court to give no-
tice to the parties of its intention to dismiss the petition. The Rule permits the defendant
to respond to the proposed dismissal within 20 days of the date of the notice. In
Commonwealth v. Rykard 88, the Superior Court considered the type of claims that could
be raised in response to a notice of intent to dismiss. After appointed counsel filed a no-
merit letter and the PCRA court issued a notice of intention to dismiss, Rykard re-
sponded to the notice by challenging the ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel. In addition,
Rykard raised new claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. Because Rykard's response
was filed after the expiration of the one-year time bar, the Superior Court initially con-
sidered whether Rykard's claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel was a serial petition
subject to the PCRA time-bar89 or an amended petition under Pa.R.Crim.P. 905. The
Superior Court held that a claim of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel raised for the first
time in a response to notice of intent to dismiss a defendant's first PCRA petition is not
a second, serial or amended petition but instead an "objection to dismissal". The court
found support for its holding in finding that a response to a notice of dismissal and a pe-
tition have "traditionally, and in practice, been viewed as distinct."90 In addition, the
court noted that Rule 907 does not treat a response to a notice to dismiss as either a se-
rial petition or an amended petition. The original meaning of the"second or subsequent
petition" language of the PCRA "did not include a response to a notice of intent to dis-
miss." Finally, the court held that a defendant is not permitted to assert new claims of
trial counsel ineffectiveness in a response to a motion to dismiss. Instead, a defendant
must seek leave to amend his petition in his Rule 907 response in order to raise new non-
PCRA counsel ineffectiveness claim.91
86. The Court noted that the Superior Court had found that subdivisions (b)(2) or (b)(3) of the Rule did
not apply to a DNA testing order and the parties had not argued that the other subdivisions of the rule
were applicable to the resolution of the issue.
87. Ben v. Swartz, 729 A.2d 547, 550 (Pa. 1999).
88. 55 A.3d 1177 (Pa. Super. 2012).
89. In Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 879 n.4 (Pa. 2009), the Court assumed without discussion that
raising the ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel in response to the PCRA court's notice of intent to dismiss
did not constitute a serial petition. The Court held that claims of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel cannot
be raised on appeal from the denial of PCRA relief because such a claim amounts to a serial petition in
violation of the PCRA time-bar. See also Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 893, n.12 (Pa. 2010). In
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562(Pa. 2013) the Court noted that although a defendant has an "en-
forceable right to effective post-conviction counsel", "there is no formal mechanism in the PCRA for a
second round of collateral attack focusing on the performance of PCRA counsel"and acknowledged that
the Court "has struggled with the question of how to enforce the 'enforceable' right to effective PCRA
counsel .. "
90. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 43, 440 (Pa. 2011).
91. Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080 (Pa. Super. 2014) ( applying Rykard and holding claims waived
where the defendant did not seek leave to amend his petition in his response to notice of intention to dis-
miss or otherwise preserve his trial counsel and PCRA counsel ineffectiveness claims).
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COLLATERAL REVIEW AND MENTAL RETARDATION
In Adkins v. Virginia,92 the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited the execution of mentally retarded persons. The Court left the
determination of how to apply the prohibition to the individual states. In Commonwealth
v. Miller,93 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set out the procedure for the resolution of
an Adkins claim on collateral review.94 The court held that the defendant must establish
mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence using either the definition of
mental retardation developed by the American Association of Mental Retardation
(AAMR) or the definition in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-IV). These definitions require a defendant to establish limited intellectual func-
tioning as evidenced by an IQ score below the 65-75 range, significant adoptive limita-
tions, and age of onset before age 18. The court held that there was no "cut-off IQ".95
Rather, it is the "interaction between limited intellectual functioning and deficiencies in
adoptive skills that establish mental retardation."96
In Commonwealth v. DeJesus97. the Pennsylvania Supreme Court court considered
whether the PCRA court erred when it found Dejesus was mentally retarded under
Miller and vacated his death sentences. The Commonwealth claimed that the evidence
presented at the PCRA hearing did not support relief under Adkins and that the court
erred when it denied the Commonwealth's motion to reopen the record to introduce re-
cently obtained information from prison officials concerning Dejesus's use of smuggled
cell phones which the Commonwealth claimed shed doubt on Dejesus's claim of men-
tal retardation. More specifically, the Commonwealth urged the Supreme Court to aban-
don the current clinical standard for evaluating post-conviction claims of mental retar-
dation because of the "significant motivation" for defendants to malinger on tests that
were not intended for use in a judicial context. The Commonwealth also urged the Court
to increase the burden of proof on Adkins claimants and to adopt certain evidentiary fac-
tors concerning the adoptive functioning prong of the Adkins/Miller standard. The Court
declined to alter the substantive three-part Adkins standard and to increase the burden
of proof higher than preponderance of the evidence on collateral review.98 The Court
also rejected the adoption of legal presumptions or cautionary instructions that would
govern all retrospective assessments of mental retardation. The Court stated that the
"prospect of malingering and the incentive to slant evidence" are relevant considera-
tions for the Commonwealth to argue to the factfinder in assessing test results and the
defendant's overall case. In addition, in assessing an Adkins claim raised on collateral re-
view, the court approved the use of the evidentiary factors set out in Ex Parte Briseno99
92. 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
93. 888 A.2d 624 (Pa. 2005).
94. The court noted that because Miller involved the procedure for the resolution of a claim of mental
retardation on collateral review, it did not need to reach the question of whether mental retardation is to
be resolved by a judge or jury at trial. In Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24 (Pa. 2011), the court devised
a process for Adkins claims originating at trial. Specifically, the court reaffirmed that the burden of proof
is on the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. In addition, the court held that the jury decides an
Adkins claim at the penalty phase prior to considering aggravators and mitigators and that the jury's find-
ing of mental retardation must be unanimous.
95. In Commonwealth v. Williams, 61 A.3d 979 (Pa. 2013), the court explained that although an individ-
ual's IQ was the primary measurement of limited intellectual functioning, individuals with scores above
and below 70 are both required to demonstrate major deficiencies in adoptive behavior in order to be
found mentally retarded.
96. Post-Miller, in Commonwealth v. Crawley, 924 A.2d 612 (Pa. 2007), the court held that the standard of
review of a PCRA court's determination of mental retardation is "whether the factual findings are sup-
ported by substantial evidence and whether the legal conclusion drawn therefrom is clearly erroneous."
In Commonwealth v. Bracey, 986 A.2d 128 (Pa. 2009), the court concluded that when an Adkins claim is
raised on collateral review, the PCRA judge and not a jury serves as the fact-finder.
97. 58 A.3d 62 (Pa. 2012).
98. The court noted that as a policy matter the General Assembly could increase the burden of proof.
99. 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.Crim.App.2004).
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which focus on the adoptive functioning element of the Adkins test.100 The Court noted
that like the court in Briseno, it was not adopting the factors as presumptions or as a
checklist but instead as "evidentiary factors" with discretion in the Adkins factfinder to
determine "which factors in a given case my be helpful in assessing the defendant's
adoptive functioning."
With respect to the Commonwealth's claim that the PCRA court erred when it
denied its motion to reopen the record and to consider additional evidence including
Dejesus's alleged acquisition and use of a cell phone, the court initially addressed
whether and when a PCRA court making an Adkins determination should consider
newly-discovered evidence. Noting that the Rules of Criminal Procedure do not
address the issue, the court held that the PCRA court has discretion to entertain non-cu-
mulative newly discovered evidence within the"overall goal of achieving substantial jus-
tice." Specifically, a court should consider the timeliness of the request, the reasons for
the lateness of the request, the substance of the evidence proffered and whether allow-
ing the presentation of the evidence would be prejudicial. Applying these factors, the
court found that the PCRA court had abused its discretion in not entertaining the
Commonwealth's new evidence. The court concluded that the evidence was relevant to
the intellectual and adoptive elements of Adkins because it reflected a type of"sophisti-
cated thinking" and adoptive functioning at odds with the defense portrayal of Dejesus
as a person challenged since childhood to accomplish basic tasks in life. The court also
held that the evidence was neither cumulative of what was already heard by the PCRA
court nor prejudicial because it concerned Dejesus's own conduct and was subject to ap-
propriate challenges upon remand.10 1
100. In Briseno, the court identified the following factors for the factfinder to consider in weighing
evidence of mental retardation:"Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage-
his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities-think he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if
so, act in accordance with that determination? Has the person formulated plans and carried them
through or is his conduct impulsive? Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that he is led
around by others? Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of
whether it is socially acceptable? Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written
questions or do his responses wander from subject to subject? Can the person hide facts or lie effectively
in his own or others interests? Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital
offense, did the commission of that offense require forethought, planning and complex execution of pur-
pose?" 135 S.W.3d at 8-9. For a critique of the Briseno factors, see Brief for the American Association on
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (formally the American Association on Mental Retardation)
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Chester v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 525 (2012) (No.11-1391), 2012 U.S.
Lexis 8447. See also John H. Blume et al., Of Adkins and Men: Deviations from Clinical Definitions of Mental
Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 689, 710-714 (2009); Carol S. Steiker et al.,
Adkins v. Virginia: Lessons from Substance and Procedure in Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 57
DePaul L. Rev. 721. 727-728 (2008).
101. The Supreme Court also considered the issue of whether the defendant was ineligible for the
death penalty under Adkins in Commonwealth v. Keaton, 45 A.3d 1050 (Pa. 2012) and Commonwealth v.
Williams, 61 A.3d 979 (Pa. 2013). In Keaton, the court affirmed the PCRA court's finding that Keaton had
failed to establish he was mentally retarded. The PCRA court concluded that while Keaton had satisfied
his burden of proof regarding limited intellectual functioning and onset of symptoms prior to the age of
18, he had failed to establish significant limitations in adaptive functioning. Because Keaton's expert did
not perform standardized testing of Keaton's adoptive skills as recommended by the AAMR, the PCRA
court examined the record but failed to find evidence that Keaton had a significant limitation in at least
two of the skills set out in DSM-IV. In Williams, the court affirmed the PCRA court's finding that Williams
was mentally retarded. The PCRA court found Williams's IQ was between 70 and 75, that he had signifi-
cant deficits in adaptive functioning under both the AAMR and DSM-IV, and that Williams's mental re-
tardation was present prior to age 18.
